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BOOKS
Reviewed
THE LAw AK s: REcRuITmNT AND ADAPTATION To LEGISLATmV LI2. By
James David Barber. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1965.
Xii + 314 pages. $7.50.
This book will interest everyone who is concerned with the quality and
effectiveness of our state legislatures. It will specially interest lawyers because
its empirical data and conclusions can be applied to an evaluation of the
judiciary's competency, through court-ordered or court-inspired reapportion-
ment, to remedy the problems alleged to result from malapportionment. Much
of the debate surrounding the reapportionment decisions1 has centered on the
appropriateness of judicial intervention in this traditionally legislative area
because of the impact such intervention has had on the balance of judicial-
legislative and federal-state power. Critics of the decisions claim that the
Supreme Court should not have declared the problem justiciable, because the
one man-one vote rule is of doubtful validity as a constitutional standard for
achieving fair representation, because the court-ordered shift of power from
rural to urban voters upsets the desired judicial-legislative balance,2 and because
the decisions mark the end of our federal system 3 The purpose of this Review
is not to continue the constitutional debate, but to use the information collected
in The Lawmakers to determine the probable effects the reapportionment deci-
sions will have on the quality and effectiveness of state legislatures and to sug-
gest the impact any improvement may have on the present federal-state balance
of power.
The reapportionment decisions proceed from the unarticulated premise that
state legislatures, as they are presently constituted, are unable to deal effectively
with the problems produced by an urban society. A corollary premise appears
to be that a legislator is responsive primarily to his local constituency, and then
only in proportion to the amount of pressure it exerts upon him. The Court
rejected the theory that a constituency is made up of so many diverse interests
that the legislator cannot perceive a clear mandate and must therefore formu-
late his own notion of his constituency's interest. The Court apparently assumes
that if representation is given to urban areas, representatives will become more
i. E.g., Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (x963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (I962).
2. See McCloskey, The Supreme Court 1961 Term-Foreword: The Reapporitionment Cases, 76
Hrtv. L. Ray. 54 (1962); Neal, Baker u. Carn: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUPREME CouRT Rv.
252. But see Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value,
x964 SUPREME CoURT REv. I.
3. For a discussion of the assertion that the reapportionment decisions "may well prove to be the
death.knell of federalism" see Caruso, The Lucas Case and Reapportionment of State Legislatures, 37
U. CoLO. L. REV. 433, 456 (1965).
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inclined to solve pressing urban problems such as the need for rapid transit,
urban renewal, or new mass recreational areas. Barber demonstrates that obtain-
ing legislative effectiveness is not such a simple matter. He suggests that more
accurate criteria for measuring legislative effectiveness can be developed by
examining the characteristic types of roles assumed by legislators in relation
to the substantive results they produce.
The Lawmakers is not a study of reapportionments impact on state legisla-
tures and unfortunately, because of the limited scope of Barber's investigation,
it is not totally adapted to the inquiry this Review undertakes. The Lawmakers
is a study of the channels of recruitment to legislative office and their relation-
ship to the legislator's ability to adapt to the lawmaking process. It was under-
taken to determine whether "a political system designed to bar tyrants, check
power with power, and eliminate the corrupt and incompetent also produces
excellence in government" To answer this question, Barber studied only the
Connecticut House of Representatives. This Reviewer recognizes the limited
scope of such an empirical investigation, but because Connecticut had one of
the most notoriously malapportioned state legislatures at the time of this study,5
it may be wrong to assume that the roles ascribed by Barber to the Connecticut
legislators will be repeated with the same consistency in less malapportioned
states. For there is a correlation between the legislator's adaptation to the law-
making process and his population base.
The Lawmakers compares the channels of the legislator's political recruit-
ment with his ability "to move beyond his problems of personal adjustment, to
transcend himself, and focus clearly on the real external world.:" Barber finds that
of the four types of legislators identified-Spectator, Reluctant, Advertiser, and
Lawmaker-three have little ability to do this because they "appear in the inter-
views as people with rather severe deficiencies in self-esteem. Furthermore, their
low self-estimates seem to be linked in significant ways with their political partici-
pation.'" Barber demonstrates that only the legislator who does not use partici-
pation in the legislature to compensate for feelings of personal inadequacy-the
Lawmaker-has the inclination to grapple with the pressing substantive issues
faced by the legislature; this legislator has become a professional. Barber's thesis
is that state legislatures fail to achieve their potential quality and effectiveness
because most of their members remain nonprofessionals and thus do not adapt
to the lawmaking process.
The Spectator is least able to adapt to the lawmaking process. He is a direct
4. P. I-
5. Prior to a suit asking that the state legislature be reapportioned, 12% of Connecticut's voters
could elect a majority of the lower house. Only one other state, Vermont, had a lower percentage of
voters necessary to control the lower house. Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportionment, 72 YALE
L.J. go, ioo-oi (r962). For a historical discussion of the evolution of state legislative districts in Con-
necticut see Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754, 758-61 (D. Conn.), afl'd sub norn. Pinney v.
Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964) (remanded for proceedings consistent with Reynolds v. Sims).
6. P. 253. Psychological studies indicate that although most political opinions are a reflection of
one's personality, intelligence plus self-confidence best equip a person to form abstract opinions which
are not primarily a reflection of preconceived attitudes. See generally SmiTH, BRauNEa & Wsrer_,
OPINIo Ns AND P.RSONAYx (1956).
7. P. 217.
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product of Connecticut's historic township constituencies where as few as 191
people were entitled to one and sometimes two representatives.8 Town leaders
induce the Spectator to run because they consider him a respectable nominee
who, because he personifies community values, can be counted on to represent
their interests at the capitalV Often the more important criterion, however, is
willingness to serve the two-year term. This leads to the selection of older repre-
sentatives of "modest achievement, limited skills, and restricted ambitions."'"
Once in the legislature, the Spectator is concerned with avoiding rejection by other
members of the legislature, for he has "nagging doubts about his worth as a
person."" His adjustment to legislative life is limited to superficial friendships
with other legislators; he avoids contact with party leaders. He is satisfied
to sit back and be entertained by the social life of the legislature, and has little
personal desire to contribute to the resolution of substantive issues except to
ratify or reject the solutions of others 2
It is probable that the Spectator will not survive in a legislature whose dis-
tricts have been apportioned on the basis of population. His presence in the
malapportioned legislature is facilitated because little activity is demanded of
him since he represents a numerically small constituency. A more populous con-
stituency will generate many more problems requiring legislative solution and
consequently will demand more aggressive representatives who can produce
results.
The Reluctant, a variant of the Spectator, can adapt to the decision-making
process to the extent of gaining a familiarity with the rules of procedure, but he
cannot feel at home in the hustle which accompanies the resolution of important
issues.'x The Reluctant, like the Spectator, is a product of noncompetitive recruit-
ing, but he is more likely to have had experience in local government. 4 He de-
rives personal pleasure from participation in the legislature because he views the
activity as fulfilling his civic obligations.' 5 Because he is usually elderly, partici-
pation helps to convince him that he is still a useful person. He has no desire to
become a professional as "he finds it difficult to establish an intermediate type
of relation with the younger and more aggressive urban members."'8 Thus, con-
tent to learn the rules and occasionally study an issue in depth, he feels satisfied
even if his contribution to the work of the legislature is limited to having infused
into it a sense of the traditional moral virtues.
The Reluctant is also likely to be swept away in the wake of reapportionment.
Recruiters in more populous areas will not be content with elderly candidates
who merely project an image of old-fashioned civic virtue. They will look for
8. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at oo.
9. Only 17% of the Spectators originated action to secure their nomination, compared with 52%
of all other legislators. P. 25.
io. Ibid.
M. P. 53 .
12. Pp. 49-54.
X3. Pp. 139, 159.
14. 67% of the Reluctants had previously held elective office in local government, as compared
with 4% of all other legislators. P. 12'.
15. Pp. 14o-44.
i6. P. 139.
January x966]
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younger and more aggressive candidates who "can impress new people with
their intelligence and energy."'
The two participative roles are the Advertiser and the Lawmaker. The Ad-
vertiser, generally a young professional person, uses the legislature to get into
the limelight. It is a poor reflection on the legal profession that he is typically a
young lawyer experiencing occupational difficulties18 He has the ability to con-
tribute much to the substantive work of the legislature, but he does not have the
"patience necessary to master the legislative arts,"'9 and thus does not fulfill his
potential for contribution. He does not see the legislature as a means for ad-
vancing long-range solutions to abstract problems, for "it is especially clear that
Advertisers do not link their personal interests or emotions with specific legis-
lative accomplishments. 2 The Advertiser's personal desire to get on to bigger
and better things makes him feel cramped by the limits of the state legislature
and frustrated in his station. The Advertiser's frustration is that of a person who
desires to be a highly regarded professional either in his trained profession or in
politics but who cannot gratify this desire in the state legislature because most
legislatures offer few of the outward signs of prestige, such as a decent salary,
ample staff assistance, office space, and the public exposure and respect associated
with public office.
If it is assumed that the legislature will become effective only as more of its
members concentrate on the substantive aspects of the lawmaking process, re-
apportionment may do little to change the status quo, since Advertisers are
likely to be elected from newly created constituencies. However, the problem is not
in the Advertiser's intellectual deficiencies, but in abating his frustration toward
legislative service. It is unlikely that the Advertiser will take a more constructive
role in the lawmaking process until service in the legislature offers public acclaim
and financial rewards commensurate with the skills required. Nevertheless, if
legislatures are apportioned on the basis of population, it is possible that a mo-
mentum for internal reform will be generated and in the end a more profes-
sional legislature will result. More legislators will represent constituencies that
will increasingly look to the legislature for solution of their problems. These
voters may be more tolerant of measures designed to upgrade the office of state
legislator-measures which have been opposed by members who represent con-
stituencies which adhere to the concept of a citizen legislature and thus place
few demands on the legislature. Given this upgrading, the Advertiser's sense of
frustration should abate and he should be able to concentrate his energies on
substantive problems instead of merely seeking the limelight.
Having described the preceding three legislative roles, Barber turns to the
natural question, "How does the legislature get anything done?" The answer is,
through those who assume the Lawmaker role. The Lawmaker is the product of
a populous constituency, but population alone does not account for his legislative
7. P. 23 9 .
18. P. 2x5. See also my Book Note, Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence, 17
STAN. L. REv. 187 (1964).
19. P. 112.
20. P. 9 8.
[Vol. 18: Page 539
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effectiveness. The difference between the Advertiser and the Lawmaker must be
found in their different personalities, for "the individual's political behavior repre-
sents a collection of adjustive techniques or strategies by which he attempts to
maximize the satisfaction of his needs. The particular strategies an individual
employs depend on the special needs he brings to his political experience and the
availability in that environment of satisfactions for these needs" '2 The chief
characteristic of the Lawmaker is his self-confidence, which allows him to pitch
his level of achievement to goals that are capable of realization within the limits
of the state legislature. He has a sense of perspective, which allows him to find
satisfaction in his personal achievements without feeling they are unimportant
compared with his capabilities and desires. Thus, while service in the state legis-
lature reinforces the Lawmaker's ego, it only frustrates the Advertiser's. Of the
four characteristic types of roles assumed by legislators, the Lawmaker is best
able to move beyond problems of personal adjustment and concentrate on the
resolution of substantive issues.22
The personality traits which determine whether an entering legislator is more
likely to assume the Advertiser or the Lawmaker role are often determined long
before he is recruited for political office. Social scientists agree that an interest in
politics is often a product of family environment. Barber refines this theory with
his finding that family influences may also determine whether the legislator later
views politics as a chance to act on public issues or as a chance to advance his
career. Barber finds, "generally then, the Lawmakers appear to have a more deeply
rooted interest in elective politics-stemming from family participation-than the
Advertisers do, while the Advertisers tend to have come up through the appointive
ranks and stress more recent, occupational ties to politics." '
The author concludes that the best hope for an effective legislature, a place
where primary attention is focused on the substantive work to be done, is one in
which the Lawmaker is recruited and retained, because "the key to rehabilitation
of the legislature branch is in the nature of the legislator's job and his attitude
toward it. ' 2 ' As we have seen, this can only be done through internal legislative
reform, such as giving adequate salaries, office space, and staff assistance. Perhaps
the reapportionment decisions, by inspiring wholesale reapportionment in the
United States, can contribute little to legislative effectiveness as defined by Bar-
ber, for there is no guarantee that constituencies apportioned on a population
basis will approve the upgrading of the legislature necessary to eliminate the
frustrations that plague the otherwise capable Advertiser. However, this writer
believes that the reapportionment decisions will have a positive effect on the
quality and effectiveness of our state legislatures. They may contribute to the re-
cruitment and retention of more Lawmakers; in addition, given the likelihood
of a greater reliance on the legislature by urban-centered constituencies, there is
likely to be an approval of legislative reform leading to the conversion of Adver-
21. P. 213.
22. Pp. 181-96.
23. Pp. x67-68.
24. P. 257, quoting Hyneman, Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel, 195 ANNA.s oF
THE AucwN AcA y' OF PoLricAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 21,31 (1938).
January 1966]
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tisers into effective and professional legislators. Should either or both of these
occur, the decisions will have made an important contribution to our state legis-
latures which may counterbalance any present disruption of the balance of power
between the legislative and judicial branches of our government. The reappor-
tionment decisions may also help to strengthen our federal system by effecting
a shift of power back to the states. It has long been recognized that the present
limited effectiveness of state legislatures has been in part the result of "the tainted
character of their representational base, [thus] State legislatures have contributed
to their decline in standing and to the encouragement of attempts to bypass their
authority."25 A state legislature focused on the pressing problems presented by
urban society should be able to halt this trend.
A. DAN TAR.LocK*
ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY. By Walter F. Murphy. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. 1964. 249 pages. $7.5 o .
This book, written by a political scientist, is likely to annoy a good many law-
yers. Indeed, judging from certain of the early reviews, it already has annoyed a
few. Conflict between lawyers and political scientists often arises over the subject
of courts and judges. To a political scientist the judge is just another governmental
official whose behavior must be studied and described. Whether that description
contributes to the prestige of judicial office and the public reputation of courts is
a matter of indifference to the political scientist qua political scientist, just as the
impact of his descriptions on the status of the Bureau of the Budget, the city coun-
cil of Omaha, or the House Education and Labor Committee would be. The posi-
tion of the lawyer, even the academic lawyer, is quite different. It is a self-con-
ceived moral duty of the legal profession, backed by a considerable dollop of
economic and social self-interest, to foster public respect for our legal institutions
and most particularly to conduct itself in such a way as to contribute to the dignity
and reputation of the courts for impartial justice.
The conflict arises when the political scientist wishes to say something about
courts that is true but which is likely to detract from their public image.1 The
lawyer, after all, can hardly say: yes it is true, but the truth should not be told.
The lawyer, too, shares the general ethic of seeking and revealing truth that is so
central to Western intellectual traditions. Nor can he say: yes it is true, but it is a
truth that must be kept within the priesthood of the law. If the political scientist
has gotten hold of it, it is already in the hands of the gentiles, and it is too late to
25. Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How To "Sear the Conscience" of Legislators, 72 YALE L.J. 23, 26
(X962). In i955 the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations concluded that "if states do not give
cities their rightful allocation of seats in the legislature, the tendency will be toward federal-municipal
dealings." 1955 COMMISSION ON INTERGOVE NMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO TIM PRESIDENT 39-40.
* A.B. x963, LL.B. x965, Stanford University. Instructor, University of California, Los Angeles,
School of Law.
i. I am not claiming that political scientists are the sole source of inconvenient truths about judges.
Judges have obviously been the principal source of inconvenient truths about judges.
(Vol. I8& Page 539
